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CHAPTER I
THE INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDES OF
THE MIDDLE AGES
Any attempt to describe the intellectual climate
of sixteenth century Europe necessitates a progressive
study of the current of Western thought.

The heritage of

ancient Greece and Rome, the rise of Christianity, and the
influence of alien cultures all played important parts in
formulating European attitudes.

In retrospect, however,

these factors seem to be of an evolutionary rather than
revolutionary nature.

The accumulation of knowledge from

the downfall of the Roman Empire until the latter part of
the Middle Ages was a gradual and one-sided process.
Christianity and the consequent creation of the institution of the church provided the only cohesive element
active in this process of accumulation.

Thus the energy

of creativeness in almost every field was channeled toward
the glorification of the Christian God.

This situation in

no way detracted from or frustrated creative thinking as
long as it remained inside definite bounds, but it did
effectively discourage attempts to propagate unorthodox
ideas.
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The pinnacle of ecclesiastical authority was reached
during the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries.
The church at this time was not only the supreme spiritual
power, but was also respected as a higher authority in
temporal matters than were the ruling kings and princes.
Final authority rested not on a foundation of military or
political power, but in the unquestioning faith of medieval
man in the theological teachings of Christianity.

St. Anselm,

the French Benedictine who became the Archbishop of Canterbury, clearly displayed this type of faith when he wrote in
his famous proof of the existence of God:

"I do not seek

to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order
to understand.

For this also I believe, that unless I

believed, I should not understand." 1

St. Anselm's search

for knowledge under those conditions was representative of
the complete trust that medieval man placed in his church
and God.
Religion was their chief preoccupation because they
desired salvation. Although the love of knowledge
for its own sake was far from uncommon, the scholars
of the age sought knowledge primarily because t~ey
hoped it would aid them in achieving salvation.
It is important to note that because the authority
of the church was so far reaching, every individual was
1Anne Fremantle, The Age of Belief: The Medieval
Philosophers (New York: The New American Library, 1955),
p.

88.

2sidney Painter, A History of the Middle Ages,
248-1500 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 430.
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duly influenced by it.

The unity of Europe such as it was

under feudalism was not a political unity, but that of a
unity of Christendom.

A major drawback of this situation

was that the intellectual contributions of the Middle Ages
for the most part remained static and conservative.

The

arts, science, philosophy, and, of course, theology were
completely subjected to principles concerning the salvation
of the soul and the concept of eternal life.
If it were possible to completely ignore the
achievements of architecture, the conclusion that middle
age art produced little in terms of originality would be
valid.

However, by the twelfth century the religious theme

provided a brilliant stimulation in this area, and the
results were . . . . . churches that were at once works of
art and places of worship. • • •

ffend] to the believing

medieval [persoti) a daily instrument of believed religion ... 3
Since science was not considered to be an instrument
of salvation, advances in this field were practically nonexistent.

"Medieval lack of interest in natural phenomena

and disregard of individual judgement had their roots in
the domination of a supernatural outlook, an other wordly
mentality."4

However, "In assaying the progress made in

3Irwin Edman, Arts and the Man (New York:
Norton & Co., 1939), p. 41, 42.

w. w.

4Abraham Wolf, A History of Science Technology and
Philoso h in the 16tn & 1 th Centuries {New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1935 , p.2.
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the development of human knowledge during the Middle Ages,
it is important to distinguish between the theoretical and
the purely pragmatic. • • •

Increases of knowledge by

observation and experience was particularly great in
agricultural and industrial techniques.••5
science was not so fortunate.

Theoretical

As was mentioned earlier,

theories regarding the physical and natural sciences that
transcended theological guidelines suffered either rejection
or, in some cases, advocates of unapproved theories were
persecuted.
The extent of scientific retardation can be easily
understood by examining one of the concepts of intermixed
dogma and natural science:
Thus the lion has these characteristics. As he moves
along, he erases his footprints with his tail. This
symbolizes the secrecy of the Incarnation. Then, the
lion sleeps with his eyes open. That is the way the
body of Christ slept on the cross. Finally, the
lioness bears her cub dead and on the third day the
father roars in its face and brings it to life. T@is
signifies Christ's resurrection on the third day."
The scientist, because he believed at least superficially in the complete authority of the church, found
little inclination to question the validity of such reasoning,

The secular, objective view of science was to come

at a later age, but the middle age mind subjected to
religious boundaries tended to view such things as nature
5Painter, p. 435, 436.

6Ibid., p, 433.
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through an aura of mysticism.

"The intellect was not yet

in possession of the resources that would have enabled it
to come under the spell of scientific discovery ... 7

Even

after the scientific method asserted its superiority,
modern science found it very difficult to shrug this
influence of mysticism inherited from the Middle Ages.
Theology and philosophy were the most active
concerns in middle age thought.

The rise of scholasticism,

especially the second part of the movement which lasted
approximately from 1200 to 1450, saw the subservience of
philosophy to theology. 8

The position that philosophy was

forced to assume resulted from the spirit of the thought
that was dominant during the above mentioned dates.

Faith

and reason, to use more easily defined terms, were considered by the scholastics as the two roads that led to
the same conclusion:

the existence of God.

however, were not completely separate.

The roads,

The Bible and other

divinely inspired works were considered to be foundations

from which any conclusion drawn from reason must originate.
"Since the philosophers of the period were primarily
7Bernard Guillemain, The Later Middle Ages, trans.
Taylor. Vol. 77 of the Twentieth Century Encyclopedia
of Catholicism, ed. Henri Daniel-Hops (158 vols.; New York:
Hawthorn Books, 1960), p. 103.

s.

8 The first part of the movement started around
850 A.D. with the establishment of the schools of
Charlemagne. It ended around 1200 A.D. The intellectual
activity during these two dates centered almost completely
around the philosophical problems concerning universals.
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scientific theologicians, their rational interests were
dominated by religious preoccupations.

Hence, while in

general they preserved the formal distinctions between
reason and faith, • • • the choice of problems • • • was
controlled by theology."9

The extent of theological

domination is clearly demonstrated by the most famous of
the scholastic philosophers, St, Thomas Aquinas, when he
writes in his Summa Contra Gentiles:
No one tends with desire and zeal towards something
that is not already known to him. But men are ordained
by the divine Providence towards a higher good than
human fragility can experience in the present life.
That is why it was necessary for the human mind to be
called to something higher than the human reason here
and now can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire
something and with zeal tend towards something that
surpasses the whole state of the present life. This
belongs especially to the Christian religion, which in
a unique way promises spiritual and eternal goods.
And so there are many things proposed to men in it
that transcend human senses.10
Thus, Aquinas points out that human reason can discover
certain truths about the nature of God, but it can only
carry us so far.

When pitted against the mysteries of

faith, reason fails and help must be sought from revealed
religion.
9Hunter Gunthrie, "Scholasticism," Dictionary of
Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Patterson, H.J.:
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1962), p. 280.
10st. Thomas Aquinas, "On the Truth of the Catholic
Faith, Book 1 : God, " Knowledge and Value, (ed. ) Elmer
Sprague and Paul w. Taylor (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1959), p. 333.
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Aquinas' philosophy was a successful attempt to
offset what could have been a thirteenth century reevaluation of Christian dogma.

The scholastics, with their

interest in learning, came into possession of the major
portion of Aristotle's writings.

St. Thomas, for his

part, found temporary success in fusing the use of reason
as taught by the pagan Aristotle, with the faith of the
Christian religion.

But soon after the death of St. Thomas

this union was challenged, and more and more doctrines of
the church began to be withdrawn from the reach of reason
and assigned to faith alone.
Though one of the main objectives of the scholastic
movement was to create a harmonious union between rational
and revealed truths, most energy was spent in defending
church dogma against the subtle assaults of Hellenic
rationalism.

The attempt to fuse these two alien forms

was an unacknowledged failure.

The more daring and

original minds began to recognize this by the end of the
scholastic period, but the ecclesiastical minds continued
the struggle well into the Renaissance.
Before tracing intellectual activity into the
Renaissance period, it would be well to evaluate the
achievements of the Middle Ages.

The nature of this

discussion has been critical, but only because the author
has been observing this short history of thought from contemporary standards.

The church during the Middle Ages

8

stood as an obstacle in the path of progressive thinking
not as an enemy, but because it was simply the only
criterion available.

By later standards this norm seemed

quite narrow and generally unproductive, but it must be
noted that religiously orientated thought was representative
of the values practiced during that period of history.
Consequently, the church provided a refuge for all individuals beset with issues that threatened peace of
mind.

Philosophical questions concerning such problems as

immortality of the soul, existence of God, and man's
relation to the universe were not staggering or overwhelming challenges to the intellect.

Revealed religion

along with holy scripture proved beyond a doubt that these
questions were merely concerned with the trials of temporal
existence and had absolutely no bearing on God's plans for
eternity.

In the same light, a sound formula for salvation

was within the mental grasp of every member of the church.
While constructing his own distinct civilization,
middle age man achieved heights that eventually became of
significant historical importance.

Ideas and traditions

stemming from this period not only influenced the
Renaissance, but modern times as well.
The doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church have been
little changed since the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, and
they are today a very vital element in our culture.
The ideas of individual freedom that marked the members
of the feudal class became a strong element in later
conceptions of the rights of man. 11 Il
11Painter, p. 478.
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The achievements of the Middle Ages are tremendous
when measured in the light of the materials available to
man at that time, but when they are measured against the
period immediately preceeding it, the difference between
evolutlonary and revolutionary thought becomes apparent.
In the latter part of the fifteenth and in the
sixteenth century the west, • • • left the medieval
home in which it was brought up and began to study at
the new university of human life opened up by the
extraordinary changes in orientation that the hundred
and fifty years following the fall of Constantinople
(1~-53] eff~c ted in man's outlook on himself and the
universe.
Thus, the Jiliddle Ages gave way to the Renaissance, which in
turn, served as a period of transition between medieval
and modern times.
12B. A. B. Fuller and Sterling M. I'1cMurrin, A
History of Philosophy, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1966), p. 1.

CHAPTER II
THE RENAISSANCE AS A PERIOD OF
INTELLECTUAL TRANSITION
Needless to say, in a period which witnessed
such monumental events as the introduction of movable
type, the discovery of the new world, and the Reformation,
it is difficult to point to any one event as being of
more importance than the others.

However, for this dis-

cussion the revival of interest in classical antiquity
coupled with the secularization of learning stand out as
accomplishments which stimulated new and, by medieval
standards, daring speculations.

Humanism, a product

growing out of these two movements, began not in the
Renaissance, but in the late Middle Ages.

Thomas Aquinas'

attempt to fuse pagan thought with Christian doctrine
combined the pursuit for truth and beauty with the struggle
for salvation.

The early days of the Renaissance saw

this term take on a new and more human meaning.

"The

broader definition of humanism states the typically
Renaissance notion that man and his activities

(!rere]

the most important and interesting elements of the
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universe.

Thus, man himself, rather than God, [was] the

proper subject of contemplation and examination."13
The new enthusiasm for Greco-Roman civilization
began both geographically and spiritually in Italy.
Although northern France had been the home of scholasticism
during the Middle Ages, northern Italy became the undisputed birthplace of the initial phases of the Renaissance.
Numerous reasons can be found for this shift of intellectual
residences, but the most critical factors were the political
and social developments that took place in Italy during
the last stages of the Middle Ages.

The form of govern-

ment in Italy during this period was unlike that of the
rest of Europe in that feudalism was rarely a popular nor
practical method of control.

Instead, the geographic

areas were divided into numerous independent city-states
ruled by an oligarchy composed of nobles and rich merchants.
Much like the earlier Greek city-states, cities such as
Venice, Genoa, Milan, and Florence engaged in serious
competition for trade, wealth, and culture.

Thus, a climate

favorable to intellectual endeavors attracted artists,
writers, and scholars who in turn were eagerly supported
by wealthy patrons.
13John Louis Beatty and Oliver A. Johnson {ed.),
Heritage of Western Civilization {Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 300.
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The zeal for Greek and Latin classics reached its
highest pitch in Italy in the fifteenth century and
the first half of the sixteenth, and it was gradually
communicated to other countries. By the sixteenth
century the study of pagan classics 4 . . was being
prosecuted throughout Christendom."1
As the effects of the "new learning" began to spread,
the more serious European thinkers began to utilize the
fresh freedom of thought.

Some of the most distinct and

influential products of the period were Erasmus of Rotterdam,
Luther, Machiavelli, Galileo, and Copernicus.

Though no

original philosophical thought came out of the Renaissance,
new approaches in science, political theory, and art began
a course of separation that eventually liberated the latter
fields from the combined spheres of theology and philosophy.
Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536), along with his
close friend Sir Thomas More of England, "was • • • deeply
influenced by the skeptical thought of the Renaissance.
Erasmus • • • wrote various Colloquies containing observations and commentaries on the contemporary world, and, more
lasting perhaps, published his penetrating analysis of
people and affairs under the title In Praise of Folly ... l5
The sharp and delightful satire exhibited by Erasmus won
for him little praise from his victims, but the fact that
he was able to successfully publish such critical material

York:

14carlton J. H. Hayes, Modern Euro~e to 1870 (New
The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 9 •
15Beatty and Johnson, p. 301.

1.3

gives praise not only to his literary genius, but also to
his deep insight into the affairs of his contemporaries,
Though a devout member of the Roman Catholic Church,
he felt that the clergy bore most of the responsibility
for the disgusting condition of the church.

In 1509, he

published a satirical masterpiece titled In Praise of Folll
which systematically criticized every type of consecrated
ecclesiastical office.

Of the bishops he wrote:

If our bishops would but stop and consider what their
white albs signify--namely, sincerity and a pure life
in every way untainted; • • • it would be safe to say
that they would not lead such troubled and shameful
lives. But as it is they are kept too busy feeding
themselves to think on these things; as for the care
of their sheep, they delegate this duty
one of
their subordinates or to Christ Himself.

!g

The cardinals, monks, and priests came under similar
denunciation, but the papacy received the brunt of the
attack.

Concerning the popes, Erasmus wrote:

As to the Supreme Pontiffs, if they would recall
that they take the place of Christ and would attempt
to imitate His poverty, tasks, doctrines, crosses, and
disregard of safety; if they were even to contemplate
the meaning of the name Pope--that is, Father • • •
then they would become the most humble and mortified
of men • • • (j3ut] the popes of our time still insist
on profanely attaching Peter's name to territories,
cities, taxes, wages, and all money. These are the
things they fight to uphold with fire, sword, blood-inflamed by the zeal for Christ, of course. Having
thus fought, they believe themselves to be justly
called defenders of Christ, bragging that they have
routed the enemies of the Church--as if the Church had
any greater enemies than these charlatan popes • • •
16nesiderius Erasmus, "In Praise of Folly," The
Essential Erasmus, trans. John P. Dolan (New York: The
New American Library, 1946), p. 156,
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who corrupt His teachings by forced interpretations,
and who scandalize Him by their infamous lives.17
Erasmus, residing in northern Europe, wrote his
critical evaluations from a removed yet subjective position.
His concern for the gross hypocritical state of the Church
was motivated by his devotion to the teachings of Christ.
Unfortunately, the literal teachings of Christ had little
value in the everyday battles for power and influence
waged within the institution itself and by the church
against governments seeking to control or usurp its wealth
and power.
The popes who ruled after the [Great] Schism ended
did little to restore the tarnished prestige of the
throne of St. Peter. The Renaissance popes were far
more concerned with establishing the papacy as an
Italian political power, patronizing arts and learning,
living in splendor, and enriching their relatives and
favorites than thel 8were with improving their role as
religious leaders.
With these objectives in mind, the popes of the early
Renaissance exploited areas of Europe where papal power
was not rivaled by strong monarchies.

Cries for internal

reform, particularly from areas heavily influenced by the
church, began to fall on receptive ears.
In Germany, • • • there were fewer limitations on
papal powers of appointment, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and taxation. Rome drew enormous sums of money
from Germany and the situation aroused the envy and
1 7Ibid., p. 157, 158.
18 Jerome Blum, Rondo Cameron, and Thomas G. Barnes,
The Emergence of the EuroEean World (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1966), p. 11 •
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cupidity of minor German rulers. This fact, together
with the low moral prestige of the church, made the
German people ard their rulers more receptive to the
idea of revolt. 9
The Augustinian monk who nailed to the door of the
castle church in Wittenberg, Germany, his objections condemning the unscrupulous promotion of indulgences certainly
had no intention of starting a religious revolution.
Martin Luther was occupied with the thought of reform and,
prior to his excommunication, directed his energy toward
just this goal.

Luther's profound anxiety is vividly

expressed in a letter written the same day the theses were
attached to the church door.

The letter is addressed to

Cardinal Albrecht, the Archbishop of Mainz, and in it
Luther asks his superior to put an end to the ugly marketing of indulgences.

He writes:

What can I do, excellent Bishop and Most Illustrious
Sovereign? I can only beg you, Most Reverened Father,
through the Lord Jesus Christ, to deign to give this
matter your fatherly attention • • • and command the
preachers of indulgences to preach in another way. If
this is not done, someone may rise and, by means
of publications, silence those preachers. • • • This
would be the greatest disgrace for Your Most Illustrious
Highness. I certainly shudder at this possibility,
yet I am afraid it will happen if things are not
quickly remedied.
I beg Your Most Illustrious Grace to accept this
faithful service of my humble self in a princely and
episcopal--that is, in the most kind--way.20
19Ibid., p. 115.
20Martin Luther, "To Cardinal Albrecht, Archbishop
of Mainz, Wittenberg, October 31, 1517, .. Luther's Works,
Vol. 48: Letters I, (ed.) Gottfried G. Krodel and Helmut T.
L•3hman (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 48.
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As history shows, Luther's pleas for reform were
largely ignored.

Eventually he was excommunicated and

declared a heretic.

However, the seeds of revolt against

Rome had fallen on fertile ground, and the protestant saw
the first organized internal resistance registered against
the universal authority of the papacy and the church.

The

Reformation succeeded in removing approximately one half of
the population of Europe from the Catholic Church and thus,
the medieval unity of Christendom was shattered.
The causes of the Reformation and the consequences
resulting from this loss of unifica-tion constituted a
complicated phase of transition 1n itself.

Probably one

of the more notable changes in the area of thought was
the attempt to reject or purge the influence of medieval
Christianity.

The humanistic mind, particularly in Italy,

openly displayed contempt for the medieval ascetic view of
existence.
Nature, so it was argued, had equipped man for action
and usefulness to his family and fellow men; the culture
of the humanists was not to lead man into seclusion.
Also, material possessions must not be viewed merely
with suspicion; for they provide the means for
virtuous deeds, and the history of man has been his
progress in becoming lord of the earth and its
resources.21
This reaction against the "dark ages." as it was
termed by Renaissance scholars, affected all areas of
21 G. R. Potter (ed.), The Renaissance 14
Vol. I: The New Cambridge Modern History London:
Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 73.

20
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learning, and since emphasis was placed on creativeness,
there is a temptation to conclude that statecraft was a
product of this period alone.

"There seems no reason to

believe • • • that the Renaissance introduced the idea of
a state as a work of art, which could be created.

But it

did introduce the idea that the theory of politics
should be a political and not a theological concern."22
Niccolo Machiavelli expressed this realistic
secularization of political theory when he described
what he felt to be the proper conduct of the ruling
prince.

Published in Italy around 1532, The Prince won

for its author nothing but outraged criticism from both
protestant and catholic sources.

The individuals dealing

with rulers during Machiavelli's life were simply not
removed enough from medieval-dominated attitudes to
calmly accept such statements as:
You must realize this: that a prince and especially
a new prince, cannot observe all those things which
give men a reputation for virtue, because in order to
maintain his state he is often forced to act in
defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of
religion. And so he should have a flexible disposition,
varying as fortune and circumstances dictate. • • • he
should not deviate from what is good if that is possible.a.
but he should know how to do evil, if that is necessary.~3
22M. L. Bush, Renaissance, Reformation and the Outer
World (London: Blanford Press, 1967), p. 301.
23Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans, George
Bull (Bungay, Suffolk, England: The Chaucer Press, 1961),
p. 101.
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Taking into consideration the war-torn condition of his
beloved Florence, Machiavelli's work was a plea for
stability, namely the political stability that he felt
existed in classical Rome.

However, Renaissance man

viewed his plan as a wicked work inspired by the devil.
In his attempt to break with mysticism, he states:

"I

am not unaware that many have held and hold the opinion
that events are controlled by fortune and by God in such
a way that the prudence of men cannot modify them, indeed,
that men have no influence whatsoever.

Because of this,

they would conclude that there is no point in sweating
over things, but that one should submit to the rulings
of chance ... 24

In reality, which was exactly what he was

dealing with, Machiavelli hoped to channel the existing
intrigue and corruption into a logical, scientific system
of political control.

But neither the ecclastically

dominated rulers of Italy, nor Renaissance man had the
ability to transcend the state of naive hypocrisy that
Machiavelli rebelled against.

"It was not until the late

seventeenth century that the views of Machiavelli were
made effective.

Only then was it generally possible, in

the Machiavellian manner, to regard political theory in
wholly political terms. 0 25
24 Ibid., p. 130.
25Bush, p. 304.
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Basically, the problem of theological deterrence
remained in the field of science also.

The degree of

importance attached to science in the Middle Ages, as
pointed out earlier, was minimal and, because of this,
Renaissance scientists such as Copernicus and Galileo were
forced to work under very difficult conditions.

These

very conditions and the skeptical reaction against them
paved the way not only for the new science, but also for
modern philosophy.
The most important way in which men in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reacted against
the Italian Renaissance was in matters of natural
science. The Renaissance certainly prepared the way
for the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth
century, but when it came, the revolution was
achieved by dispensing with the basic tenets of
Renaissance learning; namely, its reverence for the
world of antiquity and its mistrust of systems of
thought.2 6
It is rather ironic that the popular revival of
classical learning, which was so important to Renaissance
man, possessed the seeds of destruction for both ideals.
The scholarly interest in all the writings of the ancients
naturally forced new and more accurate translations.

"The

humanists of the Renaissance made important contributions
not only by unearthing long-lost texts but also by freeing
ancient texts of the mistranslations, abbreviations and
misguided commentary with which they had become distorted
and encrusted during the course of intervening centuries. 11 27
26rbid., p. 305.
27Ibid., p. 306.
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Thus, when the original texts, stripped of the haze of
superstition, were presented to scientific minds, many of
the gross misconceptions of the Middle Ages became disappointingly clear.
As a reaction against centuries of haphazard
speculation, specialists in all areas of knowledge began
to rely on precise measurements based on newly introduced
scientific instruments and controlled experiments.

There

were not only doubts about the validity of the medieval
texts, but also of the foundations of ancient knowledge
itself.

The critical study of this knowledge exposed both

the truth and error in classical thinking and forced
scientists to realize that the traditional criterions were
not as infallible as once thought.

The search for a new

and more reliable standard eventually saw the downfall of
classical and ecclesiastical authority.

The quest for

knowledge now assumed a pragmatic view, and the escape
from middle age mysticism began.
"The most dramatic and revolutionary advances were
made in the study of physics and astronomy.

For centuries

Western man had accepted the Greek view of the cosmos,
which wac in agreement with appearances.

Men could plainly

see the celestial bodies move each day in a circular path
around the earth; consequently, they constructed a geocentric or earth-centered cosmology. 028

The church was

28 Blum, Cameron, and Barnes, p. 188.
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in full agreement with the geocentric concept of the
universe mainly because it provided a foundation for the
idea of the benevolent God-man relationship.

"Everything

was conceived as having been intended and designed to
serve some human needs.

One might almost say that God

himself was regarded as mainly occupied with human affairs.
When mankind was thus conceived as the focus of cosmic
economy, the earth, their stage, was naturally looked
upon as the centre of the universe ... 29
The revival of ancient knowledge was also accompanied
by a renewed interest in witchcraft and astrology.

Popular

witch hunts of the sixteenth century contributed nothing to
the advancement of science, but the age old belief in the
power of the stars roused Renaissance soothsayers to study
with renewed vigor the nature of the heavens.
Astrology was held the noblest of sciences, and its
enlightenment and guidance sought in the most important affairs of life. As an explanation of the
world and human fortunes, it rivalled or peacefully
paralleled religion and belief in the devil. Progress
in physics and astronomy and firmer conceptions of
physical laws were gradually to dissolve this
authorative congeries of unsound conviction.JO
Nicolaus Copernicus, born in 1473, was one of the
first Renaissance thinkers to cast doubt on the traditional
2 9wolf, p. 5.
JOHenry Osborn Taylor, Philosophy and Science in
the Sixteenth Century, Vol. V: Thou6ht and Expression in
the Sixteenth Century (New York: Collier Books, 1962),
p,

88.
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geocentric concept of the universe.

Criticism of the

geocentric theory did not originate with Copernicus' ideas.
"Nicholas of Cusa had declared that the earth moved like
the planets, and was not the centre of the universe • • • •
Likewise, Leonardo asserted that the earth is not fixed at
the centre of the celestial world, nor at the centre of the
circle of the sun, which is the central body, and the source
of light and warmth.

But these ideas were not as yet

fortified with any proof ... 31

Copernicus, bothered by the

discrepancies he discovered in the writings of the Greek
astronomers, set out to simplify and correct the calculated
movements of the celestial bodies.

"He found that ancient

Greek scientists had suggested that the sun, not the earth,
stands immobile at the center of the cosmos. • • • •
Inspired by this discovery, he showed by brilliant calcu1ations that the motions of the heavenly bodies can all
be explained by assuming a sun-centered or heliocentric
universe ... 32

Though the hypothesis was founded on seemingly

convincing evidence, strong opposition arose from almost
every corner of the Renaissance world.

Copernicus realized

that his theory would cause a great stir, and, consequently,
he put off publication in order to avoid confrontation with
the religious and intellectual forces.

However, a simplified

31rbid., p. 93.

32 Blum, Cameron, and Barnes, p. 191.
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explanation of the above Greek model of the universe
shows that:
• • • the earth stood unmoving at the center of a series
of hollow, transparent spheres that daily rotated around
the earth. Each of the crystalline spheres had embedded in it one of the heavenly bodies--the sun, the
moon and the five known planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars,
Jupiter, Saturn). Next came the sphere of the fixed
stars, holding the stars that move about the earth but
seem to be motionless with respect to one another.
Finally there was an outermost sphere, the primum
mobile or .. first mover," which provided spin to the
spheres nested within it. Beyond lay the "empyrean,"
where God dwelt. The heavenly bodies • • • were thought
to be made of a pure and immortal substance, entirely
different from4 the corrupt and mortal matter that made
up the earth.3
33~ •• p. 189.

34rbid., p. 188.
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In direct refutation of the Greek model, translations from Copernicus• original Latin texts show that:
1.
2.

3.
5.
6,

7.

There is no one centre for all the celestial
orbits or spheres.
The centre of the Earth is not the centre of the
World.
All the planetary orbits circle around the sun at
the centre of them all.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The apparent movement in the firmament is due to
the movement of the earth; accordingly the earth
turns once a day on its unchanging poles, while
the firmament and ultimate heaven remain unmoved.
Whatever movement we find in the sun is due to the
earth and our orbit in which we are rolled around
the sun; and thus the earth has several motions.
Th8 apparent irregularities in the movements of
the planets are
be ascribed to the motion of
the earth • • • 3

go

35rbid.,

p.

191.

36Taylor, p. 96.
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The essence of the hypothesis eventually became known, and
Copernicus suffered verbal chastizement from various
thinkers, including Martin Luther.

Religious leaders from

both camps of Christianity denounced the hypothesis as
being nothing but a rash denial of scriptural teachings.
They based their argument around verses twelve and thirteen
in Chapter Ten of the Book of Joshua.

The quote states

that prior to a battle between the men of Israel and the
Amorites, Joshua said:
"Sun, stand thou still at Gibeon,
and thou moon in the valley • • •
and the sun stood still and the moon stayed, . . . . . 37
Because Copernicus' critics felt that the Bible did in fact
state nothing but the truth, they treated the heliocentric
theory as a speculative nuisance rather than a dangerous
threat.
"The man who paved the way for a more satisfactory
explanation of planetary motion was Galileo, professor of
mathematics at Padua, and a man of many interests who examined every scientific subject under discussion in his day.
In the study of the universe his first great contribution
was to convince most people that the Copernican system • • •
was fundamentally sound. •·3~ With the aid of a telescope,
37Jos. 10:12-13.
38oavid Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century
(London: MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 48.
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Galileo discovered, among other natural phenomena, sun
spots and the moons of Jupiter.

Thus, he convinced him-

self of the validity of Copernicus' theory and set out
with scientific zeal to persuade the unappreciative
Renaissance minds.
tion.

The crusade met with violent opposi-

"He soon discovered • • • that scholars, philosophers,

and churchmen • • • opposed the Copernican system because
they felt that it flew in the face of theology and common
sense . . . . . . 39

Part of the threat to theology has been

discussed in the case of Copernicus, but the threat to
common sense deserves special attention because of the
problems it produced for the seventeenth century.
As noted earlier, the Renaissance and Reformation
were largely responsible for the breakdown of the universal
authority of the Catholic Church.

Once its totalitarian

position began to crumble, the criterion that had been the
mainstay for European thought disappeared with it.

Salva-

tion of the soul, which was still of prime importance to
sixteenth and seventeenth century western man, was being
offered by every fragment of the Christian religion.

Each

possessed its own doctrine and each claimed that eternal
life could be gained only through its own method of worship,
The pain of doubt had burdened the Christian population
since the Reformation.

With the advent of the new science,

39Blum, Cameron, and Barnes, p. 196,
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which was effectively introduced by such men as Galileo
and Kepler, Western man was forced to re-evaluate his
whole concept of knowledge,
Prior to the introduction of the new science,
European man, under the guidance of scripture, was convinced that his knowledge was, in fact, truth.

He had little

reason to feel that his ideas concerning the nature of the
universe and his central position in relation to it could
be false.

There was also little serious speculation about

a universe that extended infinitely back or infinitely
forward in time,

In short, it existed in the finite

bounds of both time and space. 4

°

Creation presented no

problem, for the complete story could be found in Genesis
along with the description of the fall of man.

So when

the climate of intellectual security was seriously threatened
by theoretical science, Renaissance man reacted with
natural disbelief.
Galileo's confirmation of Copernicus' heliocentric
theory not only disproved the validity of traditional
beliefs, but it questioned the very possibility of man's
ability to find knowledge that was true and final.

To the

common man, Copernicus' theory did not prove to be a
crushing problem for most of them could readily point out
that sensory observations clearly showed that the earth
did not move and the sun did.
40see diagram, p. 23.

However, Galileo's
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revelations based on scientific instruments and refined
mathematics eventually made an impact on serious thinkers.
This resulted when he discovered "that the movement of
bodies anywhere in the Universe were subject to the same
laws, and therefore could be explained in mechanical
terms ... 41

His observations dispelled the traditional and

revered study of Aristotelian physics, and Renaissance man
saw the destruction of yet another criterion,
By the end of the sixteenth century, Western man
was left with very little of what could be considered
certain and undeniable truth.

The intellectual upheavel

of the Reformation and the consequent splintering of
Christianity destroyed the universal authority of the
Church.

The new scientists, forsaking both tradition and

established authorities, undermined man's personal tools
of learning and judgement by casting doubt on the ability
of the senses to report an object as it was in itself, not
just as it appeared.

The rebirth of ancient learning re-

sulted in the revival of the sceptical attitude which,
because of the general climate of intellectual chaos,
became the rule rather than the exception for leading
thinkers.
levels.

This feeling infected most men of all educational
The individual, free from complete intellectual

domination, began to assert this newly won freedom in a
hesitant fashion.
41

The uncertainty was caused by the

Bush, p. .314.
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possibility that one could evaluate the truthfulness of a
particular statement according to one criterion, only to
find that other individuals could invalidate the statement
by using other criterions.

Thus, forced to fall back upon

himself, man found that even his trusted senses could not
be

counted upon to serve him with complete faith.

still

lr;flu·~:n tlal

argum~nts

The

Church fought for minds with medieval

on the one hand, and with such persuasive

instruments as the Inquisition on the other.

Finally,

"Deprived of his traditional patterns and rules of judgement and of choice, man • • • f:re1t] himself lost in an
alien and uncertain world, a world in which nothing
certain and everything

was

was

possible."42

The philosophers of the late Renaissance period
made every effort to break completely from the scholastic
system with its buttress of Aristotelian logic.

"With

reservations as to Francis Bacon, their systems presented
a certain magnificent confusion, and lacked a sure foundation in some irrefragible basic principle. 0 43

With learning

fragmented there was no basic theme which would encompass
all knowledge and give it final meaning.

Therefore,

sixteenth century philosophers began to formulate their
thoughts into various methods that were personally comfortable
42Alexand Koyre, Descartes: Philosophical Writings,
ed. and trans. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach
(New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons Lts., 1961), p. ix.
43 Taylor, p. 109.
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but not reliable in the sense of being a universally
accepted system.

"Thus confusedly equipped, they were at

sea with their own thinking upon the metaphysics of the
universe. • • •

Their thoughts in general sprang from

their imaginations pricked by the new physical theories
and enlarging knowledge of the world ... 44

To add to the

disorder, both Catholic and Protestant leaders were unreceptive to new ideas influenced by the new science.

The

Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake
in 1600 by the Inquisition for advocating a naturalistic
and mystical pantheism.

Other advocates of philosophy

based on or influenced by new science were sternly warned
not to propagate ideas that ran contrary to current
theology.
By 1600, most of the authoritarian obstacles to
intellectual freedom were rapidly losing influence.
Scientists were still under the spells of mysticism, and
the classical method of deduction.

But advances in mathe-

matics and science exposed weaknesses in the method of
reasoning from the general to the particular.

Philosophers

of this period were viewed as early modern due to the fact
that they made a final break with the medieval method by
introducing a new method using an inductive process.

The

application of this new method of reasoning in one sense
completed the transition of thought from the Middle Ages

44 Ibid., p. 110.
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to the modern period.

The influences of medieval thought,

scholasticism, mysticism, and the Renaissance continued, but
to progressively lesser degrees.

The new scientists hap-

hazardly began the transition phase, but it was left to
the first of the modern philosophers to co-ordinate the
movement and at the same time lay the foundations for
modern philosophy.

CHAPTER III
DESCARTES AND SCEPTICISM
Rene Descartes, the French philosopher who later
became known as the father of modern philosophy, was born
in 1596, the son of a lawyer who was a member of the
lower nobility.

When he reached the age of eight, his

father enrolled him in the famous Jesuit school at
La Fleche.

Here Descartes was given a solid background

in the typical scholastic curriculum.

His reaction to the

scholastic method is recorded in his Discourse on Method •

.. •

• • I was ardently desirous of instruction •

But as

soon as I had finished the entire course of study • • • I
found myself involved in so many doubts and errors that I
was convinced I had advanced no farther • • • than the
discovery • • • of my own ignorance ... 45

However, the

Jesuits did succeed in opening Descartes• mind to the
study of mathematics and science.

As a young student, his

father sent him, with a substantial allowance, to the city
of Paris.

"For a youth of seventeen he behaved himself

45Rene Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences,"
French Philoso hers From Descartes to Sartre, (ed.} Leonard
u
s ing ompany, 1961),
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extraordinarily well in the circumstances. • • •

It was,

however, comparatively easy for him to keep his head, for,
young as he was, he had already developed the inner
detachment, • • • and the dislike of society, that always
characterized him."46

Instead of indulging in entertain-

ment and diversions, he began a serious study of mathematics
under the guidance of the famous French mathematician,
Mydorge.

Descartes testifies to his own almost passionate

love of mathematics in the Discourse on Method:

"I was

especially delighted with mathematics, on account of the
certitude and evidence of their reasonings; but I had not
as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; • • • thinking that they but contributed to the advancement of the
mechanical arts ... 47

By the time he had reached age

twenty-one, the lure of travel and adventure drew him from
Paris to Holland.

There he entered the army of Prince

Maurice of Orance and began a career that saw him serving
in various armies throughout Europe.

Finally in 1629, the

"settled in Holland where for twenty years he devoted
himself to developing his philosophical system and
46Fuller and McMurrin, p. 55.
47Descartes, "Discourse on Method," p. 32. (The
reference to his ignorance as to the true use of mathematics is meant to show that prior to his discovery of
analytical geometry, Descartes was under the impression
that mathematics were applicable almost entirely to the
mechanical arts. The Discourse on Method was written
in 1637, while the discovery was made around 1617.)
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publishing his works ... 48

During this time he began

corresponding with the brilliant Queen Christina of Sweden.
Eventually he accepted an invitation from her to tutor her
in Cartesianism and to draw up a plan for a proposed
academy.

He arrived in Stockholm in the late fall and as

a result of a severe winter contracted pneumonia and died
in February of 1650.
11

Descartes• life and personality partake of the

drama of his age.

It [was] a life of passionate devotion

to research, of discoveries, of sudden illuminations, of
wandering and unrest, of bitter controversy ... 49

Probably

his attraction to this type of life forced his move from
Paris.

The liberal climate of Holland, recently enhanced

by independence from Spain, provided an ideal setting for
Descartes' work.

But such was the situation that even

there strong opposition to his "atheistic 11 writing forced
him to seek protection against religious outrage.

The

rector of the University of Utrecht attacked the Cartesian
system because it proposed that the earth did move and
thus was not the center of the universe.
Galileo's treatment

at

Also, word of

the hands of the Inquisition

moved Descartes to leave unpublished a work concerning the
48 Frank Sewall in a special introduction to The
Methods, Meditations, and Philosophy of Descartes, trans.
John Veitch (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1901), p. vii.
49Ralph M. Eaton (ed.), Descartes, Selections,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. xii, xiii.
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physical operation of the world.

Thus the devout Catholic,

who realized the value of the new science, was embroiled in
controversy with both Catholic and Protestant leaders.
With this confusion in mind, Descartes wrote what he
finally considered to be an answer to the scepticism
produced by the Renaissance and a guide or criterion for
the search for knowledge that was true and final.

Part

of his attempt to combine the traditional beliefs with the
new scientific method was termed the "Meditations."
The "Meditations" were designed in part to be
experienced by serious sceptics willing to set themselves
in a spirit of deep reflection.

Thus, Descartes regulates

the tone of the discussion when he writes in the preface:
"I would advise none to read this work unless • • •

they

• • • are able and willing to meditate with me in earnest,
to detach their minds from commerce with the senses, and
• • • to deliver themselves from all prejudice • • • • 50
With this mental attitude in mind, he moves to the "First
Meditation" in which he proposes to doubt all his former
beliefs.

It is not his intention to establish as false

all his former opinions, but only to verify their trustworthiness.

Previous to this personal state of objectivity,

Descartes reports that all his knowledge came to him
50Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy,"
From Descartes to Locke, (eds.) T. V. Smith and Marjorie
Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957),
p.

51.
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through the senses.

However, "I observed that these some-

times misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to
place absolute confidence in that by which we have even
once been deceived. 0 51

He asks:

are our senses trustworthy?

The new science of the period, as stated earlier, forced
man to consider this question.
the extreme.

Descartes carries it to

After satisfying himself that any type of

knowledge obtained through the senses is subject to doubt,
he then attacks the physical reality of those objects that
the senses perceive.

He considers the fact that his eyes

readily report the shape, color, and size of an object,
but this same object has appeared to him many times while
he was sleeping and his eyes were closed.

But, as he con-

cludes, "It must be admitted • • • that the objects which
appear to us in sleep are, • • • painted representations
which could not have been formed unless in the likeness
of realities • • • and, therefore, • • • are not simply
imaginary, but really existent."5 2 This problem was in
reference to material objects which, as yet, could not be
considered as true and real.

Abstract thinking such as

in arithmetic and geometry, which do not bother with
existence, seem at least to be certain.

For, as he states:

"Whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two
51rbid., p. 56.
52rbid., p. 57.
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and three make five, and that a square has but four sides . . . . . . 53
But to doubt even this conclusion, he considers the
possibility that God has purposely deceived him.

This

part of the "First Meditation" is particularly interesting
because he immediately rejects the idea that God, being
all-good and all-powerful, would consider the role of a
deceiver.

Instead, Descartes substitutes a powerful

demon, "who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful,
and has employed all his artifice to deceive me: . . . . . 54
Yet the substitution was in no way demanded by ecclesiastical
pressure or concerned directly with theology.

The demon

represents a final move to put the reader in a state of
complete doubt.

The invention of the demon as the cause

of deceit represents the strongest attempt by Descartes to
remove himself from the influence of his previous knowledge.
For, as he states:

"Those old and customary opinions

perpetually recur, • • • even almost against my will. • • • .. 55
When, at the end of the "First Meditation," he sums up the
difficulty of escaping completely from old opinions, he
promises himself that, "I will continue resolutely fixed
in this belief [of the demon] • • • and guard with settled
purpose against giving my assent to what is false, and
53Ibid., p. 58.
54rbid., p. 60.
55rbid., p.

59.
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being imposed upon by this deceiver • • •
Other philosophers, under the influence of, or
reacting against scepticism, attempted to prove the
invalidity of all types of knowledge but never all knowledge itself.

"Descartes, however, was willing to consider

the most radical and devastating of sceptical possibilities,
that not only is our information deceptive, illusory and
misleading, but that our faculties, • • • may be erroneous. 11 57
By carrying the tools of scepticism to the highest possible
level, he was able to set aside everything concrete and
begin laying the foundations of the search for truth in
an environment void of all possible error.

Thus he hoped

to find certainty through doubt.
The "Second Meditation," the most critical of the
six, continues with the same spirit of inflexible doubt
set by Descartes in the first.

"I suppose, • • • that all

the things which I see are false; I believe that none of
those objects which my fallacious memory represents ever
existed; . . . . . 58

At this point there is no traditional

knowledge left for him to consider that might be solid
enough to resist doubt.

"Is there not a God or some

56 Ibid., p. 6O.
57Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism From
Erasmus To Descartes, (New York: The Humanities Press,
19 64)

' p. 18 2.
58nescartes, "Meditations," p. 61.
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being,

..•

mind?

But why suppose such a being, for it may be I my-

who causes • • • thoughts to arise in my

self am capable of producing them?"59

Descartes concludes

from this that regardless of all the doubts concerning his
senses, memories, opinions, and the external world, he was
at least persuaded to doubt by something.

If this is

possible, then something within him, that which could be
deceived, must undoubtedly exist.
existed, since I was persuaded ... 60

For, "I assuredly
This discovery is the

first stone of a new foundation, which for Descartes and
hopefully for the sceptical reader, proves that something
within ourselves does in fact actually exist.

Thus, by

pushing scepticism to its very limit, Descartes points
out that:

"The process of do.ubting compels one to

recognize the awareness of oneself, compels one to see
that one is doubting or thinking, and that one is here,
is in existence ... 61

Though proof of the truthfulness of

his existence is now beyond doubt, Descartes finds that
this is not enough to establish a criterion based solely
on just this fact.

He finds that after contemplating

those receptacles of knowledge which he previously thought
to be reliable, that the only mode of awareness which
59rbid., p. 61.
60rbid., p. 61.
61Popkin, p. 188.
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could possibly account for his existence is the mental
process of thinking.
from me.

"This alone [thinking
I am,

I am--I exist. • • •

and really existent; but what thing?
thinking thing, .. 62

J is

inseparable

• • • a real thing,

'l'he answer [is], a

To test the reliability of his think-

ing, Descartes uses the example of a ball of wax.

In

observing the wax, the senses report it to be light of
color, solid, smooth, and even sweet tasting.
the common attributes of wax.

These are

However, when the wax is

heated, the senses report radical changes in sight, touch,
taste, and smell.

The change is so drastic that if one

were relying entirely upon one's senses he would be unable
to report that the ll.quh1_
in

~

different form.

~·jC:U'"

[!till essentially wax, but

Descartes finds that even though the

state of the subject has entirely changed he is still
quite confident that it is wax.

Discounting his senses

as the final source of information, he concludes that he
knows the liquid is wax because the capabilities of his
mind enable him to evaluate the different states of the
wax.

Summing up the.experiment and its relation to the

problem under consideration, he writes:
But, finally, what shall I say of the mind itself,
that is, of myself? for as yet I do not admit that I
am e.nything but mind. What, then! I who seem to
possess so distinct an apprehension of the piece of
wax--do I not knm-; myself, both with gree. teT truth and
ce:rtitude, and also much more distinctly and clearly?
62Descartes, "Meditations," p. 63.
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For as I judge that the wax exists because I see it,
it assuredly follows, much more evidently, that I
myself am or exist, for the same reason: • • • And
what is here remarked of the piece of wax, is applicable to all the other things that are external to
me. • • • But in conclusion, I find I have insensibly
reverted to the point I desired; for it is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly
perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of ~
imagination, but by the intellect alone; • • • 6 J
The conclusions of the "Second Meditation" effectively
classify the school of philosophy to which Descartes
belonged.

As noted in Chapter II of this paper, the late

Renaissance period saw philosophers groping for a ne1'1
criterion on which to test the validity of knowledge.
Two of the most important schools of thought that arose
from the multitude of quests were the rationalists and the
empiricists.

The rationalists, represented in this case

by Descartes, taught that knowledge of this world could be
attained by the use of the intellect and deductive reasoning.

One of the most important theories in this school,

the one around which Descartes centered the "Meditations"
was the belief in innate ideas:

"Ideas which are inborn

and come with the mind at birth, such as God and immortality. "64

Directly opposed to this view was the

school of empiricism

which taught that knowledge could be

63Ibid. , p. 68. ( 'I'he term "see" as used by Descartes
does not refer to perception by a bodily organ, but to
images such as those produced in a dream when the eyes are
not in use.)
64Runes, p. 146.
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gained only by experience which was received solely by way
of the senses.

Naturally innate ideas were considered by

this school as, at the most, merely illusionary fancies.
But to the rationalist, innate ideas such as Descartes•
cogito

ergo~

provided a basis not only for the reversal

of doubt, but for the foundation of certainty.
Prior to the beginning of the "Third Meditation,"
Descartes accomplished three things:

(1') moved from

complete doubt to an understanding that he exists; (2) using
the same method, he discovered that he was a thinking thing,
and; (3) anything which he could perceive as clearly and
distinctly as the cogito must be certain.

Now he moves

in the "Third Meditation" to prove the existence of God.
In the earlier meditations, superior beings were mentioned,
but only as fancies of Descartes• imagination.

In order

to understand and appreciate his proofs of God, it is
necessary to grasp the meaning in which he uses the term
''idea,"

When one thinks of a man or a tree, a mental

activity within our mind produces a reasonably clear image
of the above mentioned objects.

Descartes claimed there

are three types of ideas that can be associated with
mental activity:

innate; adventitious; and factitious.

The innate ideas were described earlier; the adventitious
ideas are those that come from sources outside of the mind;
and the factitious ideas are inventions of the individual
mind, such as music or poetry.

In the attempt to prove

4J

the existence of God, he finds that only those ideas
labeled as adventitious are valid in constructing proofs
for the existence of God.
commonly called causality.

The first proof introduced is
Descartes illustrates it by

pointing out that ideas of men (or animals, or even angels)
could come from within himself, but "there • • • remains,
the idea of God, in which I must consider whether there is
anything that cannot be supposed to originate within
myself. 11 65

To discover whether there are any attributes

of God that could not originate within the mind, he lists
the qualities under consideration.

"By the name God I

understand a substance infinite, independent, all knowing,
all powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing
that exists, if any such there be, were created." 66

After

considering these and contemplating their ultimate meaning
to the thinker, he concludes that something outside and
independent of his thinking mind does exist.
And thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude,
from all I have before said, that God exists: for
though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to
this, that I myself am a substance. I should not
h~1{nver, have an idea of an infinite substance, seeing
I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some
substance in reality infinite.67
To further fortify the proof, Descartes considers the
possibility that his own creation was caused only by his

6 5nescartes, "Meditation," p. 77.

66 Ibid., p. 77.
67rbid., p. 78.
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parents or some being less perfect than God.
concludes, "this cannot be:

for as I said

But he

b~fore,

it is

perfectly evident that there must at least be as much
reality in the cause as in its effect; • • • I could not
possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my
mind the idea of a God, if God did not in reality
exist, • • •

.,68

The important fact to remember in studying

the "Third Meditation" is that Descartes intended it to be
read as a meditation in the strict sense of the word.

His

Jesuit education included numerous retreats which were
designed to remove the student from worldly influences and
place him in an atmosphere favorably receptive to the slow
penetration of religious truth.

From this exercise, the

retreatant was expected to emerge at least partially reorientated t011Tard realization of the position of the
individual man in relation to the Supreme Being.

Descartes

hoped that serious sceptics and atheists willing to follow
his method of reasoning would in fact carefully reorientate
themselves and engage the Cartesian criterion as a judge
for the validity of knowledge.
The "Fourth Meditation" dealing with truth and
error explains the origin of defective thinking.

"I am

conscious that I possess a certain faculty of judging,
which I received from God, • • • it is likewise certain

68rb1d,,

p.

s1, BJ.

that he has not given me a faculty that will ever lead me
into error, provided I use it aright ... 69

In the previous

meditations, Descartes established the fact that God was
all-good and could not deceive him.

But faulty thinking

certainly did exist, and Descartes' novel answer for its
existence was that error was entirely due to ourselves.
He explains it in this manner:

Each individual has within

himself two mental powers, the power to think and the power
to make judgements.

Part of the power of thinking con-

sists of what ls called understanding •. But since we are
finite beings, our understanding is, of necessity, not a
perfect understanding.

It follows then that laclc of

knowledge could be the· cause of error.

Descartes, however,

rejects this idea and places the blame on the second mental
power, that of judgement, or the will.

Lack of understand-

ing, which because of boundaries set upon the intellect,
is common to all finite beings.

Therefore, while the

power of understanding is limited, the use of the will is
not.

Lack of understaniing is merely ignorance, but

misuse of the will is error.

As stated by Descartes:

Whence, then, spring my errors? They arise from
this cause alone, that I do not restrain the will,
which is of much wider range than the understanding,
within the same limits, but extend it even to things
I do not understand, and as the will is of itself
indiffere.nt to such, it readily falls into error and

6 9Ibid., p. 84.
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sin by choosing the false in room of the true, and
evil instead of good.70
The formula for avoiding error is to simply follow the
method of reasoning set down in the "Meditations."

If

we make assertions based only on clear and distinct ideas,
then we will avoid mistakes.

However, if through our

willfulness we attempt to transcend clarity, then the
threat of error arises.

As Descartes sees it, understand-

ing and knowledge are limited to definite bounds, but the
will, because it is not limited, enables the individual to
go far beyond the resources of his knowledge.

When over-

extension of the will occurs, then resulting claims are
not to be trusted.

Thus, "as often as I so restrain my

will within the limits of my knowledge, that it forms no
judgement except regard.ing objects which are clearly and
distinctly represented to it by understanding, I can never
be deceived; • • • "7l
The "Fifth Meditation" contains Descartes second
proof for the existence of God.

The argument, based on

the ideas of St. Anselm, is commonly called the ontological
proof.

However, unl.ike St. Anselm, Descartes uses a

careful, methodical approach designed to verify the
validity of his innate idea of God.

The argument begins

with a return to the clear and distinct ideas concerning
70rbid., p.

ss.

7libid., p. 91.

mathematics.

Descartes finds that his ideas of number,

extension, figure, and size, that is, ideas of mathematical properties, do not depend on his thinking for
their truth content,
sensation:

"They do not come to us through

they are innate and express the nature of our

mind, ~ndJ are elicited by our attention to what is in
us ... 72

So Descartes discovers we do not invent them, yet

we do conceive them as clear and distinct ideas and,
therefore, they exist.

In relating this type of reasoning

to the existence of God he asks:
But now if because I can draw from my thought the
idea of an object, it follows that all I clearly and
distinctly apprehended to pertain to this object,
does in truth belong to it, may I not from this
derive an argument for the existence of God?7J
In order to clarify this proposition, he dwells upon the
example of a triangle.

He finds that if he thinks of a

triangle he must also think of its form, nature, and
essence,

The idea of a triangle cannot be formulated

without its attending characteristics, that is, they
cannot be separated.

Along this same line of reasoning,

he realizes that he has "the idea of a God, • • • that is,
the idea of a being supremely perfect."7 4

Just as he

found it impossible to separate the characteristics of a
72L, F. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes, (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 217.
73Descartes, "Meditations," p, 93.

74 Ibid., p. 93.
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triangle from the idea of a triangle itself, so too, the
characteristics of the Supreme Being cannot be separated
from God,

Thus he reasons "that the existence can no more

be separated from the essence of God, than the idea of a
mountain from that of a valley, • • • so that it is impossible to conceive a God, • • • to' whom existence ls
wanting. • • • .. 75

The possibility of more than one God

is dismissed, and once he concludes the second proof for
the existence of God, he states the central theme of his
criterion for truth.
Although the right conception of this truth the
existence of God [has1 cost me much thinking, nevertheless at present I feel not only as assured of it as of
what I deem most certain, but I remark further that
the certitude of all other truths is so absolutely
dependent on it, that without this knowledge it is
impossible ever to know anything perfectly • • • •
And thus I very clearly see that the certitude and
truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone
of the true God, insomuch that, before I knew him, I
could have no perfect knowledge of any other things.76
The closing words of the "Fifth Meditation" clearly
demonstrate Descartes' attempt to close the already sharp
division between science and religion.
The sixth and last meditation deals with the
reality of material objects.

Using the reliability of

mathematics as a background, Descartes writes:

"I at

least know with certainty that such (material) things may
75rbid., p. 93, 94.
76Ibid,, p. 96, 97.
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exist, in as far as they constitute the object of pure
mathematics, since, • • • I can conceive them clearly and
distinctly."77

But he finds that this conclusion in no

way accounts for the confused ideas of sense perception.
Descartes admits that "I am accustomed to imagine many
other objects besides that of corporeal nature which is
the object of pure mathematics, as, for example, colours,
sounds, tastes, pain, and the like, • • •

At this

point, it is strange to see that Descartes, in the effort
to prove the reality of material things, has returned to
the cause of his original doubts, that of perception through
the senses.

In the past, the senses had provided Descartes

with an awareness of himself and the external world.
as he states:

And,

" • • • it seems that they could not have

proceeded from myself, and must therefore have been caused
in me by some other objects; . . . . . 79

Another factor that

forces him to return to knowledge received by the senses
is that ideas entering through these channels are much
more clear and vivid than those brought about by meditation.

Further, the power that produces these sensations

must be of a corporeal nature and somewhat represent what
the senses perceive it to be.

Near the end of the last

meditation, Descartes sums up this problem, as •..rell as

77rbid., p. 97.
78 Ibid., p. 99.
79Ibid, , p. 100.
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others dealt with in the earlier meditations.

He concludes:

• • • I ought not in the least degree to doubt of
the truth of those presentations, if, after having
called together all my senses, my memory, and my
understanding for the purpose of examining them, no
deliverance is given by any one of these faculties
which is repugnant to that of any other: for since
God is no deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am
not • • • deceived. But because the necessities of
action frequently oblige us to come to a determination before we have had leisure for so careful an
examination, it must be confessed that the life of
man is frequently obnoxious to error with respect to
individual objects; and we must, ln conclusion,
acknowledge the weakness of our nature.~O
Intellectual circles did not accept the conclusions
Descartes reached in the "Meditations.••

Moreover, the

sceptics tried to show that the "Meditations .. were just a
collection of illusions based on one man's opinion.

"The

traditional thinkers saw Descartes as a vicious sceptic,
because his method of doubt denied the very basis of the
traditional system ... 81

In reply to the attacks, Descartes

pointed out that the principles on which the criticisms
were based were themselves open to question.

Though most

philosophers and theologians voiced nothing but disgust
for the Cartesian philosophy, the new scientists readily
employed Descartes' methods as a fresh and certain approach
to the study of science.

Thus, by urging men of science

to forsake the old authorities, Descartes opened the way for
personal, independent judgement based on reason.
soibid., p. 113.
81 Popkin, p. 197.
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turn resulted in the laying of the foundations for
E'xperimental science and modern philosophy.
The whole philosophy of Descartes was dominated by
tis zealous persuit of certainty.

The "Meditations," as a

vehicle of this quest, can be looked upon not so rrnch as a
proof of reality, but as a method of achieving a sense of
certainty.

"For Descartes, science must undertake to give

the kind of knowledge which secures human felicity, and to
achieve the kind of certainty which had belonged properly
to faith. " 82
82Marthinus Versfeld, An Essay on the Metaphysics of
Descartes, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1940), p. 169,
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